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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43914 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2015-317 
v.     ) 
     ) 
BRIAN DAVID MARTIN,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Brian Martin appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when, 
following his guilty pleas to two counts of grand theft, it imposed a sentence with an 
excessive fixed term and refused to retain jurisdiction over the case.  Both decisions 
exceeded the recommendations of the prosecutor and defense counsel.  A sufficient 
consideration of all the facts in the record reveal that a shorter fixed term and/or a 
period of retained jurisdiction would have better served all the goals of sentencing in this 
case.  As such, this Court should vacate his sentence and remand this case for a new 
sentencing hearing where the district court can retain jurisdiction.  Alternatively, it 
should reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Martin plead guilty to two counts of grand 
theft, one count for receiving or transferring title of a stolen truck, and a second count 
for borrowing a different truck and not returning it before leaving the state.  (R., p.45.)  
He agreed to pay restitution for that conduct, as well as for charges which were 
dismissed under the agreement.  (R., p.45.)  In exchange, the State agreed to limit its 
underlying sentence recommendation to an aggregate term of twelve years, with three 
years fixed (five years, all indeterminate, on Count I, and a consecutive ten year term, 
with three years fixed, on Count II).  (R., p.45.)  At the sentencing hearing, defense 
counsel did not offer an alternate recommendation, saying instead, “I think the sentence 
is appropriate.  I think it would be appropriate to sentence him on a rider.”  (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.8-10.)1 
During the presentence investigation, Mr. Martin admitted that he has had issues 
with gambling and abusing Adderall.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), p.17.)  However, he also expressed a desire to get treatment for those issues, 
particularly the gambling addiction.  (PSI, p.17.)  Based on those admissions, Mr. Martin 
was diagnosed with amphetamine dependence relating to his Adderall abuse and 
impulse-control disorder relating to his gambling addiction, as well as alcohol abuse and 
generalized anxiety disorder.  (GAIN-I evaluation attached to PSI, p.2.)  The evaluator 
also noted that Mr. Martin expressed amenability to treatment options in that regard.  
(GAIN-I, p.3.)  Accordingly, the GAIN-I recommended Mr. Martin participate in 
outpatient treatment.  (GAIN-I, p.8; cf. PSI, p.20.)  A mental health examination 
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concurred in that recommendation, noting that, “[u]nless evidence exists that contradicts 
this information, no follow-up mental health treatment or mental health evaluation is 
recommended for this defendant.”  (Mental Health Evaluation attached to PSI, p.2.)   
However, additional information about Mr. Martin’s mental health issues was 
provided by his ex-wife, who reported that Mr. Martin had previously been diagnosed 
with paranoid schizophrenia.  (Addendum to PSI; see also 2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-
284, p.6 (the ex-wife’s statement that, at that time, Mr. Martin had just returned from a 
Toledo hospital where he had been diagnosed with psychiatric problems); but see 
Mental Health Evaluation, pp.1-2 (indicating Mr. Martin had not disclosed any prior 
history of diagnosis or treatment in his self-report).)2  She noted that, Mr. Martin is “a 
really good guy when he is on his treatment and a good father.”  (Addendum to PSI.)  
However, she also expressed her concerns about his ability to be successful on 
supervised release.  (Addendum to PSI.)  The district court concluded that Mr. Martin 
did not appear to have any significant mental health issues, viewing his ex-wife’s 
statement skeptically because “she’s not a -- as far as I can tell, a licensed 
psychologist.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-12.) 
The district court ultimately decided to impose an aggregate sentence of ten 
years, with five years fixed, on Mr. Martin, consisting of a five-year, wholly-indeterminate 
sentence on Count I and a concurrent ten-year sentence, with five years fixed, on Count 
                                                                                                                                            
1 While the transcripts are provided in two separate volumes, the volumes are 
consecutively paginated.  
2 The investigator’s report of the ex-wife’s statement, which was being added to the PSI, 
is only one page long.  The 2004 Michigan PSI, which was one of two attached to the 
current PSI (see PSI, p.21), appears to be comprised of several different forms, and the 
page numbers reset with each form.  Therefore, the form number will be included in 
citations thereto. 
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II.  (Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.17, L.2, p.18, Ls.16-23.)  It refused to retain jurisdiction, saying, 
“I simply don’t know what I would learn on a rider report that would change my view on 
the appropriate sentence in this matter.”  (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-7.)  Mr. Martin filed a notice of 




Whether the district court imposed an excessive sentence on Mr. Martin. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Imposed An Excessive Sentence On Mr. Martin 
 
 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Retain Jurisdiction 
 
The decision of whether to retain jurisdiction in a case is a matter submitted to 
the discretion of the district court.  State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001).  That 
discretion will not be abused if the district court has sufficient information to determine 
that probation would be inappropriate.  Id.  In this case, however, the information the 
district court had, particularly its misunderstanding of the information about Mr. Martin’s 
mental health issues and his ability to behave appropriately when properly medicated, 
reveals that the district court abused its discretion by not retaining jurisdiction in this 
case. 
The district court explained the reason it did not retain jurisdiction was “I simply 
don’t know what I would learn on a rider report that would change my view on the 
appropriate sentence in this matter.”  (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-7.)  However, the record in this 
case shows there was substantial relevant information the district court could 
have received from such a report, and that information would speak specifically to 
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Mr. Martin’s potential ability to be successful on supervised release if his mental health 
issues are properly addressed.  As a result, the district court’s justification is flawed. 
Specifically, the author of the mental health evaluation was considering only on 
the information in the GAIN-I report and Mr. Martin’s self-report.  (Mental Health 
Evaluation, pp.1-2.)  Accordingly, she was operating on the belief that Mr. Martin had 
not been diagnosed with, or treated for, a psychiatric condition previously.  (Mental 
Health Evaluation, pp.1-2.)  Based on that information, she concluded that Mr. Martin 
did not need any further mental health treatment or evaluation.  (Mental Health 
Evaluation, p.2.)  However, she provided an express caveat to that conclusion:  “Unless 
evidence exists that contradicts this information . . . .”  (Mental Health Evaluation, p.2.)  
Evidence revealing the incompleteness of that information was provided by Mr. Martin’s 
ex-wife.  (Addendum to PSI; 2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-284, p.6.)  Therefore, there was 
information about Mr. Martin’s mental health conditions and amenability to treatment 
which should have been addressed in the imposition of Mr. Martin’s sentence. 
The district court did not do so because it viewed that information with skepticism 
based on its concern that the ex-wife was not a licensed psychologist (i.e., that her 
personal belief as to what condition Mr. Martin might be suffering was not reliable 
because she was not trained in recognizing mental conditions herself).  (Tr., p.16, 
Ls.8-12.)  That skepticism is wholly misplaced in this case.  Mr. Martin’s ex-wife was not 
offering her opinion of Mr. Martin’s condition.  For example, she did not say “she 
suspected” or “she believed” Mr. Martin was schizophrenic.  (See generally Addendum 
to PSI.)  Rather, she stated, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Martin “was diagnosed as 
paranoid schizophrenic” and had been prescribed medication as a result of that 
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diagnosis.  (Addendum to PSI (emphasis added).)  Furthermore, the record shows that 
her comment was based on a diagnosis from a medical professional.  In her comments 
to the 2004 Michigan PSI author, she stated that Mr. Martin had just been diagnosed 
with psychiatric problems “while in the Toledo hospital.”  (2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-284, 
p.6 (emphasis added).)  Thus, the district court’s reason for being skeptical of the ex-
wife’s statement is wholly unfounded.  Her statement is not impacted by whether or not 
she could diagnosis such conditions herself.  Instead, it reveals that there was a 
previous mental health diagnosis, apparently by a licensed professional, and, according 
to the mental health evaluation, such information could change the treatment 
recommendation.   
More importantly to the decision to retain jurisdiction, the ex-wife also indicated 
that, if properly medicated, Mr. Martin was capable of behaving appropriately, that he 
was “a really good guy when he is on his treatment and a good father.”  (Addendum to 
PSI.)  As it stood, though, she was concerned that Mr. Martin would not be able to 
handle supervised release.  (Addendum to PSI.)  Thus, a rider report could provide 
additional information to the district court as to whether Mr. Martin’s mental health 
issues could be effectively addressed with medication, such that, with medication, he 
would be a good candidate for probation.   
The district court needs to consider the defendant’s mental health issues when 
making sentencing decisions.  I.C. §19-2523; Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 
(1999).  Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that, while the protection 
of society may be the primary goal of sentencing, see, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500 (1993), rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the 
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imposition of the criminal sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), 
superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).  
Therefore, the district court’s decision to foreclose the rehabilitative alternative (an 
opportunity that the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the GAIN-I evaluator all 
recommended Mr. Martin receive) based on its misunderstanding of Mr. Martin’s mental 
health conditions and potential for rehabilitation during a period of retained jurisdiction 
constitutes an abuse of its discretion.  
 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Aggregate Sentence 
With An Excessive Fixed Term 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.’”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Martin does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.  Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts.  Id.  Specifically, he contends that the 
district court’s decision to impose an aggregate sentence with a five-year fixed term is 
excessive given a sufficient consideration of all the mitigating facts in the record. 
In addition to the mitigating factors discussed in Section A, supra, Mr. Martin also 
took responsibility for his actions and expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing.  
(Tr., p.15, Ls.11-13; compare PSI, p.21 (noting that Mr. Martin had not taken 
responsibility during the PSI process).)  Furthermore, he agreed to pay restitution as 
appropriate on both the charged and uncharged conduct.  (R., pp.45, 63.)  The 
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Legislature has provided that willingness to pay restitution is a factor the district court is 
to consider in mitigation.  I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f).  Sufficient consideration of the mitigating 
factors in this case reveals that the district court’s decision to impose a sentence with a 
fixed term two years longer than that recommended by both the prosecutor and defense 




Mr. Martin respectfully requests this Court vacate his sentence and remand this 
case for a new sentencing hearing where the district court can retain jurisdiction.  
Alternatively, it should reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
 DATED this 16th day of June, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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